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REAL WAGE DETERMINATION IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the determinants of real wage rates using data on
Canadian labour contracts signed between 1978 and 1984.Its results are
consistent with Dunlop's neglected (1944) hypothesis that real pay movements
are shaped by product price changes (contrary to the predictions of implicit
contract theory and other models of wage inflexibility). The level of the
unemployment rate is found to lower thereal wage level with an
elasticity between -0.04 and -0.13, whereas a Phillips Curve specification
which relates wage changes to the level of the unemployment rate is not
convincingly supported by the data. These results may be seen as consistent
with the view that collective bargaining is a form of rent-sharing in which
external unemployment weakens workers' bargaining strength.
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Canada1.Introduction
The wage rate is often seen as one of the most important prices in the
economy. It shapes the distribution of income, the levels of employment and
unemployment, and the participation and effort decisions of individual
workers. Despite its apparent significance, however, the wage determination
process remains complex and controversial. Some ideas, such as the Phillips
curve, have received extraordinary scrutiny.Other issues, such as wage
rigidity theorems hysteresis and the bargaining framework which determines
wage/employment outcomes, have received little empirical attention.
This paper has two principal novel aspects. It studies the effects on
real wazes of (i) the level of unemployment and (ii) industry product
prices. The conceptual framework underlying this approach is a bargaining
analysis in which rents are divided between the firm and the trade union.
High industry selling prices lead to a large surplus to be divided.High
unemloyment acts to weaken workers' relative bargaining strength.
The empirical framework here differs from that of a conventional
Phillips Curve model. In that approach, unemployment is seen as a measure
of excess demand for labour, and a disequilibrium wage-adjustment mechanism
is assumed.Empirically this framework works unpredictably.Our study
considers instead the possibility that there is a long-run relationship
between the wage level and the unemployment level. Although this is an idea
going at least as far back as Sargan (1964), it has been largely ignored
except by a small number of economists at the London School of Economics.
A related set of issues is the extent to which insider forces and
hysteresis help shape the real wage rate.Given our empirical framework,
these ideas can be readily examined.
1Section 2 and the Appendix survey these theoretical issues and suggest
the empirical framework that may be used to examine them. Section 3 reviews
the data used, while Section 4 discusses our empirical findings. A summary
andconcluding observations appear in Section 5.
2. Theoretical Issues
The possible dependence of the rate of wage change on the level of
unemployment, made famous by the work of Phillips (1958), was examined in an
immense literature during the l960s and lOs.Sythe middle of the l980s,
however, there was no consensus as to the role of unemployment in the wage
determination process. Much of the early literature is surveyed in Laidler
and Parkin (1975); more recent contributions include Chriscofides, Swidinsky
and Wilton (1980), Beckerman and Jenkinson (1986) and Grubb (1986).
Although some investigators have found evidence for a negative relationship
between wage change and the level of unemployment, a plethora of results
exists and faith in Phillips' original conception is diminished.
In part because of such dissatisfaction, a newer tradition has recently
emerged. Work by Newell and Symons (1985), Layard and Nickell (1986),
Nickell (1987), Carruth and Oswald (1987) and others at the London School of
Economicshas attempted to estimate a real wage equation.The
unemployment rate is taken as a key independent variable inthisform of
equation.According to this new approach, the unemployment rate is not a
measure of excess demand or supply which affects the speed of wage
adjustment during disequilibrium. Instead, it shapes the real wage in
equilibrium by influencing the relative bargaining strength of firms and
workers (or unions). For this reason, unemployment has a long run effect on
2the level of real wages. A more complete formalstatementof this approach
is contained in the Appendix.
In a later section we examine empirically both the Phillips Curve and
this, more recent, hypothesis on the role of unemployment. Previous work of
this kind goes back to Sargan's (1964) pioneering study and includes Newell
and Symons (1986), who study the roles of taxandprice 'wedges' and
nominal rigidity using UK data.Incontrast, this paper estimates real wage
change equations and focuses upon the issue of whether it is unemployment or
its rate of change which enters such equations with a negative sign -see
Vanderkamp (1972). Unlike Newell and Symons (1986), who use aggregate data,
werely on data drawn from individual wage agreements signed in the Canadian
unionised sector between 1978-1984.
A second question of interest is whether wage rates are determined in
part by product prices.To quote from a key, but routinely over-looked,
passage in Dunlop (1944, p. 146),
"...Thecentral theme is that declines in product prices
and not unemployment constitute the effective downward
pressure on wage structures."
This idea contradicts the much more recent belief of wage rigidity in the
face of sectoral price movements.Implicit contract theory(e.g.,Baily
(1974), Gordon (1974) and Azariadis (1975)), efficiency wage theory (e.g.,
Solow (1979), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), and Yellen (1984)) and some trade
union models (e.g., McDonald and Solow (1981)) all bear upon the flexibility
of pay in the face of product price changes. Wage rigidity theorems along
such lines have become a routine part of modern economic theory. Yetnot
onlydo they differ radically from the beliefs of post-war labour
economists, but they are also largely untested1. However, contract data
See, however, Brown(1982)and Martinello (1988).
3allow the wage rigidity hypothesis to be evaluated in a straightforward way.
The industry's price can be entered as an explanatory variable in a contract
wage equation. In this context, simultaneity bias should be minimal because
of the micro nature of the dependent variable and because some of the
regressors are firm specific --seeKennan (1988).
The analysis of so-called insider-outsider theories -stressed
recently by Solow (1985), Blanchard and Sumisers (1986), Gregory (1986),
Lindbeck and Snower (1986) and Gottfries and Horn (1987), among others--
suggests that movements in wages are governed more by internal pressure than
external pressure. In contrast to the theory of competitive labour markets,
this branch of labour market theory implies that a firm's pay depends
principally upon its own employment changes and product market
characteristics.In this literature, aggregate unemployment has little or
no effect on the real wage rate.Instead, it depends on lagged employment
and demand shift variables2.
The three strands of literature surveyed in this section can be
investigated using the framework outlined in the Appendix.As indicated
there, firms and unions are assumed to maximize the weighted product of
their utilities above their faliback positions with respect to employment
and the wage rate. This process results in an equation for the wage rate
which depends on the alternative wage rate, union membership, the average
2 Slanchard and Summers (1986, p.1e3) write "...it seems reasonable
to expect that a reduction in the number of incumbent workers will lead to
the setting of higher wage.. ."whileSolow (1985, p.347) states "...insiders
.convert higher demand into higher wages for themselves rather than into
increased access to jobs for outsiders."
4price of competing firm goods, a demand shock variable, firm fixed costs and
the consumer price index. The alternative wage rate in turn depends on the
prevailing regional wage, unemployment insurance benefits and their duration
as well as the unemployment rate itself.
The wage equation can be estimated in either real or nominal form.
Early work on Phillips Curves assumed that nominal wage chanze depends upon
the unemployment J.. Later variants added the nominal rate of change of
prices as another independent variable --therebyconverting to the
assumption that real wage change depends upon the unemployment level. The
approach outlined in the Appendix assumes instead that the real wage
is a function of the 1J. of unemployment. Section 4 contrasts this
approach with that of the standard(inflationadjusted) Phillips Curve.
For this reason the regression equations below take the real wage, rather
than the nominal wage, as the variable to be explained.To control for
unobservable contract -specificfixed effects, the equations are estimated
in changes.
3.The Data
Much of the North-American work on Phillips Curves uses micro,
contract-based, data rather than the more standard aggregate time series
variables.This approach, which originates with Hamermesh (1970), has
advantages, particularly in the present context where bargaining
considerations are assumed to drive microeconomic agents.Wage agreement
data reflect, as closely as can be hoped, the theory outlined in the
Appendix.There appear to be no published studies using this Canadian
information in the context of bargaining models. The equations reported
5below link the extensive microeconometric literature on the Phillips Curve,
which works with rates of change of nominal wage variables, to the London
School of Economics literature that deals with real wage level equations.
The data used in this study were made available to us by Labour Canada
and are drawn from contracts reached between 420 establishments and 68
unions in a wide variety of Canadian industries3. These contracts involve
500 or more employees and were arrived at in the private, non-contro].led4,
sector between l978Ql and 1984Q4.The data tape contains information on
1015 contracts. A number of variables are reported for each agreement.
These include the effective and expiry dates of the current and previous
contract, the number of employees at the beginning of the current and past
contracts, the nominal base wage rate at the end of the previous agreement
as well as the total non-contingent wage increase implemented during the
current contract.It is, therefore, possible to measure the real wage rate
both at the end of the previous and at the beginning of the current
These include Mining, Logging, several aspects of Manufacturing,
Trade and Services.Data on the construction industry are not available
prior to 1983 and are not included in this sample.
'During1982Q3 to 1983Q4, a number of federal and provincial
programmes attempted to regulate pay in the public and para-public (i.e.
Education, Health, Federal and Provincial Administration and parts of
Transportation, Communications and Utilities) sectors. All agreements
subject to such controls were excluded from the present sample by Labour
Canada.Nevertheless, these programmes may have had an impact on wage
determination in the private sector, a possibility whichisconsidered in
section 4.
6agreement.The Consumer Price Index is included in the original data and
has a base of 1971 —100.This is used both to deflate nominal magnitudes
and as variable c in the Appendix. Real wage rates evaluated at the end of
the previous contract are denoted by (-I). Industry product price indices
were obtained from the 1986 Cansim tape and were appended to the contract
data -theyset 1981 —100.The demand shift variable (z) was proxied by
real industry GOP5. A federal controls dummy variable is also contained in
the original Labour Canada tape.
In order to implement the discussion of section 2 and the Appendix, it
is necessary to specify the ingredients of the alternative wage rate (u).
This is assumed to be a function of the regional wage rate (r) ,definedas
average weekly earnings in the same province and SIC classification, the
statutory amount of unemployment insurance available to a worker in the
region and year, the statutory duration of that benefit level and the
regional unemployment rate6. The regional unemployment rates used are
contained in the original Labour Canada tape.
5 To each contract was assigned the real GDP (1971 dollars)
generated in the same industry (ten industries are distinguished) in the
year in which the previous contract became effective.Source: Economic
Review, Ottawa, Department of Finance, 1985.
6 The average weekly earnings data is available from the Cansim
tape. The unemployment insurance benefit and duration data were obtained
from Unernolovinent Insurance, Ottawa: Employment and Immigration, September
1985. The benefits and duration of benefits in the province and year of the
unit's previous agreement were assigned to each contract.
7Before proceeding to specify empirical versions of equation (A.7),
certain issues peculiar to contract data must be dealt with. Wage
agreements reached in Canada and North-America generally last for long
periods of time, entail a small number of nominal wage revisions which tend
to be front-loaded and have no, or limited, cost-of-living allowance
clauses. For these reasons the real wage rate can be expected to be at its
highest at the beginning of a contract because that is when most nominal
wage adjustment occurs. The magnitude of this saw-tooth effect in the real
wage rate depends on the degree of indexation built into a contract and the
expected inflation rate over the life of the contract. The greater the
elasticity of indexation, the smaller the need to front-load wage
increases. For a given number of wage revisions7, the longer the contract's
duration and the greater the expected annual inflation rate, the greater the
need to set a high real wage rate at the start of a contract. Given that
the real wage rate variable on the data tape is measured at the beginning of
the contract, it is necessary to augment equation (A.7) to take account of
these issues.Thus the average -jelasticityof indexation over the
current contract, the length of the contract itself and the expected annual
inflation rate are included in our empirical equations below. These
variables are part of the original Labour Canada tape. The coefficients on
the expected annual inflation rate and contract duration should be positive,
while that on the elasticity of indexation should be negative.
No information on this variable is available in this particular
sample otherwise this would have been a useful additional regressor with an
expected negative coefficient. See Christofides (1982) for further
discussion of this issue.
8Descriptive statistics on the main variables are reported in Table I.
4. Emoirical Results
Tables 2 and 3 report our empirical results.In order to deal with
possible fixed effects, contract-to-contract time differences in the
logarithms of most variables were used. Of the original 1015 records on the
Labour Canada tape many were lost in tha differencing. Several records were
first contracts and these were, therefore, lost. Nevertheless, a large
sample of 595 observations remained. Tables 2 and 3 retain a constant term
in order to allow for possible trends in the level equations. Similar
results were obtained when constants were excluded8.
Column I, Table 2, reports an equation corresponding to equation (A.7)
in the Appendix. As Dunlop (1944) would have predicted, industry prices and
CDP have positive signs and are statistically significant at the 5Z level.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that workers share in product market
prosperity.
The regional unemployment rate is also statistically significant at the
51 level and has an elasticity of -0.069. We interpret this as an
unemployment effect on workers bargaining strength. When outside
opportunities worsen, workers wages inside the firm are depressed.
8 To the extent that the error terms in the level equations are
white noise, the error terms in the change equations are MA(l) and some
efficiency gains remain unexploited. Realizing these gains is bedevilled by
the unbalanced nature of the sample which results from varying contract
lengths. Some preliminary work suggests that the MA(l) structure appears to
be weak.
9The variable which indicates the presence of wage controls in public
sector contracts signed between 1982Q3-l984Q2 is significant, suggesting
small effects on private sector wage agreements. The regional wage rate (r)
is statistically significant at the 5% level and has an elasticity of 0.133.
However, the signs on the UI benefit variables are somewhat puzzling; it is
conceivable that this is because of multicollinearity with regional
unemployment9. This argument is consistent with the results reported in
column 2, Table 2. Whenthebenefit variables are dropped, the coefficient
and t statistic on the regional unemployment rate increase substantially in
absolute size. Column 3, Table 2, introduces the variables discussed on p.
8 above.The elasticity of indexation, contract duration and the expected
inflation rate all have the expected signs, sizeable coefficients and are
statistically significant at the 5% level. The real wage rate prevailing at
the end of the previous contract has the expected sign and is significant at
the 5% level, but its effect is small. The addition of these "accounting"
variables and the past real wage rate improves considerably the fit of the
equation: the adjusted R2 jumps from 0.476 in column 1 to 0.708 in column
3, Table 2. Given the cross-sectional nature of much of the data, this is a
satisfactory fit.Column 3, Table 2 shows that the significance of the
industry GDP variable is substantially reduced; the coefficients on and the
The simple correlation coefficients between the change in the
logarithms of UI Benefits, UI Benefit Duration and the regional unemployment
rate are 0.13 and 0.78 respectively. We chose not to combine the statutory
information on unemployment insurance variables into a single variable in
order to avoid imposing a constraint.
10statistical significance of other variables are not substantially
affected10.
Columns 4 and 5, Table 2, begin an exploration of the issue of whether
it is the change or the level of the regional unemployment rate that affects
real wage change.It is clear that the level does not perform nearly as
well as the change in the regional unemployment rate, a fact which is
inconsistent with the standard Phillips curve model.Column 5, Table 2
confirms the effects of multicollinearity between the benefit and
unemployment rate variables:relative to column 4, Table 2, the change in
the unemployment rate variable has a smaller coefficient and a substantially
reduced t value.
The comparison between the Phillips curve specification and
specifications based on equation (A.7) is continued in Table 3. This table
specifies equations which, given the nature of the dependent variable,
approximate as closely as possible equations estimated in the Phillips curve
literature.These equations include spillover variables which may be
proxied by the regional wage rate.The CPI is included in order not to
exclude the possibility of some degree of money illusion; it also short-
circuits the formation of inflationary expectations. Controls variables
are, of course, standard in the Phillips curve approach. The current
accounting variables are included in order to better specify the real wage
equations. It is clear that the change-on-level specification produces
10 To the extent that our industry product price variable measures
the average industry product price with an error, the estimated coefficients
underestimate the true ones.
11coefficients11 and tratioswhich sit reasonably well with the Phillips
curve approach.However, there is no doubt that these specifications are
dominated by the change-on-change equations of columns 2 and 5, Table 3.
This is confirmed in the encompassing equations of the same table. It is
noteworthy, however, that the equations in Table 3 are not as successful as
those of Table 2.
Returning to the latter, columns 6 and 7 check on some implications of
the insider/outsider literature. The change in the logarithm of the lagged
employment variable12 is not statistically significant, and has a positive
sign --contraryto the expectation of Blanchard and Summers (1986). In
addition, the exclusion of the unemployment variables damages the overall
goodness of fit. This is to be expected, of course, given the consistently
useful role played by the change in the unemployment rate variable.
The final column of Table 2 omits the variables which proxy the impact
of the business cycle on firms in particular industries13 .Theproduct
price variable is particularly robust and statistically significant at the
5% level and its omission is clearly inappropriate. Dunlop's (1944)
hypothesis thus appears to be consistent with these results, though the
results also suggest a role for unemployment. These findings may also be
These are -0.015 (2.14) and -0.070 (7.42) in columns 1 and 4, Table
3 respectively.
12 Note that simultaneity is avoided by use of the employment level at
the beginning of the previous contract.
13It also omits the irrelevant employment variable. A similar
equation which omits just DL Ind. Prices confirmed the inadvisability of
dropping what is clearly an important variable.
12consistent with the ideas proposed in Solow (1985). However, the estimated
equations do not favour the wage rigidity predictions discussed earlier.
Tables 2 and 3 were re-estimated using the regional unemployment rate
prevailing during the quarter in which an agreement became effective-
rather than the rate prevailing during the quarter in which the previous
agreement expired.The results obtained were similar to those discussed
above and are, therefore, not reported.Several other variables, which
proved to be not terribly useful, were also considered. These include the
industrial relations stage at which an agreement was reached, the size of
the union and a dummy variable which assumed the value of unity for unions
which signed more than arbitrary numbers of contracts.
5.Conclusion
This paper has attempted to uncover the factors which shape the
behaviour of real wage rates. It uses a sample of labour contracts signed
in the unionized sector of the Canadian economy between 1978 and 1984, and
merges this with extra information on the employing firms' industries and
regions.
There are three principal conclusions.First, the real wage rate at
the microeconomic level is inversely related to the unemployment rate in the
employer's region. Estimates of the unemployment elasticity of wages ranged
between -0.04 and -0.13.Only limited support was found for the
traditional approach in which wage changes depend upon the unemployment
level; it appears that the level of the real wage rate depends more strongly
and reliably upon the level of the unemployment rate. Second, there is
strong evidence in favour of Dunlop's (1944) hypothesis that real wage
13movements are sensitive to real product price changes14. This is consistent
with recent ideas (eg. Solow (1985)) concerning how 'insiders' convert
demand shocks into higher pay, but is inconsistent with the wage rigidity
proposition of implicit contract theory and of other models of pay
inflexibility.Third, current contract wages do not appear to depend
negatively upon the level of employment in the previous contract. If
anything, this relationship was weakly positive.
These results are consistent with the view that collective bargaining
may be seen as a process of rent-sharing.When an industry has high
selling prices, its workers benefit in the form of higher real earnings.
High unemployment in the outside labour market, however, acts to weaken
workers' bargaining power. The greater the unemployment rate, the lower the
real wage.
14 New work, on British panel data, by Nickell and Wadhwarii (1987)
also identifies a product price effect, although the authors interpret it
somewhat differently. Carruth, Oswald and Findlay (1986) report a real wage
equation for steelworkers in which the steel price enters significantly.
14Aooendix
Monopolistic competition is assumed to prevail.Risk-neutral firms
maximize the profit function
—R(n,p,c,z)-wn-k (Al)
where R(n,p,c,z) measures nominal firm revenue, n is employment, c is the
consumer price index, p is the average price of other competitors' goods
(differentiated products), z is a demand shock variable, w is the nominal
wage rate and k is fixed costs. Unions maximize the utility function
V —V(w,n,m,,c) (A.2)
where m is the union membership and w is some alternative or outside nominal
wage rate.The inclusion of others' levels of pay, summarized by the w
variable, may be justified in a number of ways. To begin with, may be the
wage available to members of the union who are unable to obtain jobs within
the firm.Second, c may -influence the utility of employed union members
through a wage parity or 'jealousy' effect.These have different
implications for the sign of the partial derivative of equation (A.2). The
first suggests that V(.) will be increasing in ,thesecond that it will be
decreasing in w.Finally, the consumer price level, c, enters equation
(A.2) to ensure the absence of money illusion. Equation (A.2) nests most of
the union utility functions considered in the literature, including the
original wage bill maximand of Dunlop (1944). Survey discussions of these
issues are available in Oswald (1985) and Pencavel (1985).
The alternative or outside wage, ,mayitself depend upon a number of
variables. It is assumed that it can be written as
—w(r,b, d, U) (A.3)
in which r is the regional wage rate, b is the unemployment benefit, d is
15the duration of the unemployment benefit and U is the unemployment rate in
the region.Hence w is to be thought of as a function of the level of pay
in the firm's own geographical area, and also of the level of income if jobs
cannot be found, namely of the unemployment benefit level. The probability
of finding work at rate r, rather than being unemployed at rate b, depends
upon the prevailing unemployment rate U.
It is convenient to follow the common practice of assuming that
bargaining can be modelled using the Nash (1953) solution. This can be
given an axiomatic justification or may be justified by appealing to a non-
cooperative game theoretic framework, in which the two sides are allowed to
make alternating offers -seeBinmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986).
-Assumethat wages and employment are chosen to solve the problem:
Maximize (V -V)1(ir- (A.4)
in which V and r are, respectively, the union's utility and the firm's
utility in the event of a delay in settlement. The constant y is assumed to
lie between zero and unity.In fact -y may itself be a function of other
variables; it may, for instance, depend on whether wage controls are in
place -- thepossibility that incomes policy affects the real wage is
explored in the empirical section.
If there is a breakdown in negotiations, the two agents receive only
their delay utilities (denoted by a ).Bargainingpower stems from the
ability to enjoy a relatively large delay utility. In the case of the firm
it is assumed that
—-k, (A.5)
namely, that during a disagreement the firm receives no revenue, and has no
labour costs to pay, but must cover its fixed costs. The union's members
16may find work temporarily during a stoppage. Therefore it is assumed that
V —V(r,n, b, in,U,c) (A.6)
Employees are not paid a wage by the firmduringa dispute but may find work
at pay level r.Unemployment, U, affects the probability of workers doing
so. It is plausible to assume that V is a declining function of U. On this
view workers' bargaining ability is weakened by outside unemployment.
The Nash bargaining problem then maximizes expression (A.4) using
equations (A.l), (A.2), (A.3), (A.5) and (A.6). The solution lies upon the
contract curve defined by the locus of tangencies between employer and
employee preferences. Using w to denote the wage outcome, equilibrium is
given by the function
**
w—w(r, b, U, c, in,p,z, k) . (A.7)
This is almost identical to the wage equation of a monopoly union model the
difference being that in a bargaining context fixed costs, k, matter because
they influence the firm's utility in the event of a breakdown in
negotiations.
Equation (A.7) can be rewritten in real terms by deflating by the
consumer price index, c. If nominal prices have no effect, i.e. there is no





Nominal wage rate (l)2 9.15 2.64
Nominal wage rate2 10.54 2.74
ProductPrice Index3 102.72 11.47
IndustryGDP4 13315.65 4689.34
Nominal regional wage rate 397.60 97.32
Regional UI Benefit5 142.43 17.99
Regional Benefit Duration6 21.93 4.17
Regional Unempl. Rate 10.11 2.91
Employment (-1) 1522.36 2274.39
Elast. of Indexation 0.11 0.30
Elast. of Index.(-1) 0.12 0.30
Contract Duration7 25.61 7.76
Contract Duration (-1) 23.79 7.41
Exp. Inflation8 6.86 2.92
Infi. Surprise8 0.06 1.90
1. Based on 595 observations from all regions and years.
2. Base wage rate in dollars per hour.
3. 1981 equals 100.
4. In 1971 dollars; ten industries are distinguished.
5. In dollars per week.
6. In weeks.
7. In months.
8. Percent, annual rates.
18A I. Leal Wage La. Eqatia
(Ic!ssc.c.Litparenchese)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (3)
Con.c.inc 0.071* 0.069* 0.003 0.014 0.021 0.02].0.0080.025
(9.30) (9.12) (0.39) (0.86) (1.21) (1.19) (1.32) (1.46)
AL md. Pricea 0.086*0.161* 0.084* 0.083* 0.084* 0.080* 0.090*
(2.18) (4.08) (2.76) (2.73) (2.73) (2.60) (2.90)
ALCI .0.409*.0.407* 0.024 0.025 0.0210.0230.010 0.100*
(-7.74)(7.42) (.534)(.569)(.453)(.506)(.211) (2.85)
ALmd.GP 0.235* 0.330* 0.056 0.051 0.0360.032-0.002
(4.75)(6.90)(1.48) (1.34) (0.91) (0.81) (0.06)
ALKeg.Wage 0.133* 0.0480.105* 0.102* 0.104* 0.103* 0.116* 0.091*
(2.23) (0.00) (2.40) (2.32) (2.32) (2.30) (2.59) (2.05)
ALKeg.UI Ben. .0.370* .0.016 .0.014 .0.012 -0.031
(5.63) (0.28) (0.25) (0.21) (0.56)
ALKeg.UI Our. .0.083* .0.034 -0.036 .0.083* -0.038
(3.16) (1.49) (1.57) (4.86) (1.67)
A Controls .0.014*_0.0L0.0.007 -0.007 .0.009* .0.009* -0.O15 .0009*
(2.63) (1.88) (1.82) (1.79) (2.15) (2.19) (4.13) (2.23)
I..Reg.Unepl. .0.006-0.008 .0.007 -0.010
(0.77) (1.05) (1.01) (1.34)
ALKeg. UnepL..0.069*.0.117* .0.056*.0.054* .0.041* .0.040* .0.040*




AL Real Wage (-1) 0.082* 0.081* 0.098* 0.100* 0.119* 0.094*
(2.26) (2.25) (2.59) (2.62) (3.17) (2.43)
A Elast. .0.091* .0.092* .0.091* .0.090* .0.093* -0.091
(6.23) (6.27) (6.24) (6.16) (6.33) (6.29)
AL Duration 0.120* 0.120* 0.119* 0.119* 0.119* 0.119*
(20.41) (20.40) (19.89) (19.86) (19.62) (19.94)
AL. Expected tnfl. 0.059*0.058* 0.054* 0.054* 0.062* 0.060*







Phillips and Bargaining Specifications
(jt statistics in parentheses)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.045* ..00C4 0.0210.208*0044* 0.118*
(2.71.) (0.76) (1.26)(9.41) (6.38) (5.16)
81. CPI 0.054 0.097* 0.096*.0.220*.0.114* 0.131*
(1.75) (3.13) (3.07) (5.37) (2.89) (3.31)
81. Reg. Jage 0.115* 0.098* 0.094*
(2.55) (2.23) (2.14)
8 ControLs .0.015*.0.006 -0.006-0.036* 0011* -0.010
(4.15) (L.60) (1.53) (7.20) (2.04) (1.80)
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